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Abstract
The paper sheds light on the Turkish experience of capital account liberalization and its effect on key macroeconomic variables, using quarterly
data in a multivariate VAR model. We also take into consideration the crisis breakpoint in 2001 and estimate the effect of shocks attributed to
capital flows, using quarterly data during the sub-periods 1989:01–2001:01 and 2001:02–2009:03. The findings indicate that capital flows have
varying effects on the Turkish economy before and after the crisis in 2001 and the evidence supports significant effects of liberalizing financial
flows on macroeconomic performance, especially during the post-crisis period (2001:02–2009:03). Moreover, this latter period exhibited evidence
of sterilization policy that has helped mopping up excess liquidity and containing inflationary pressures. These factors seem to signal deliberate
efforts by the Central Bank of Turkey to stem the risk of appreciation of the real exchange rate and preserve export competitiveness during periods
of high financial inflows, a trend that has been reversed recently by the surge in outflows and currency depreciation in many emerging markets in
anticipation of imminent normalization of monetary policy in the United States.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, many countries in the
developing world have taken measures to liberalize their
capital and financial accounts in order to capitalize on a larger
pool of global liquidity that seeks opportunities for higher
return across the globe against the backdrop of easing
monetary policy in many advanced economies in the wake of
the global financial crisis that has left the world awash of
liquidity searching for competitive returns across borders.
There is a widespread belief that more financial and capital
inflows could play a fundamental role in boosting growth and
welfare by improving the allocation of capital based on
productivity and rate of return across recipient countries.
However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis,
concerns have risen about the risk of speedy financial
integration in developing countries, in the absence of
necessary reforms to ensure prudence and mitigate potential
risk. To substantiate these arguments, we cite some cases
where previous experiences of financial liberalization may
have turned to be disastrous and contributed to wide-spread
financial crises in Mexico (1994), South East Asia (1997),
Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2001) and in Argentina
in late 2001 and early 2002. More recently, there has been a
surge in the literature on the consequences of the waves of
capital flows on the macroeconomic performance as a result
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of the extremely loose monetary policy of the FED and
monetary authorities in many advanced countries and the
corresponding swelling of global liquidity spilled over to
emerging markets.1
Turkey was among the first group of countries in the MENA
region to liberalize its capital and financial account, a task
which was completed as early as 1989. However, the post-
liberalization experience for Turkey in the 1990s was not as
successful as expected. Financial integration was implemented
before undertaking the necessary reforms to ensure a strong and
efficient financial system that would facilitate mobilizing the
additional resources which has become available post-
liberalization. As a result, the country underwent two serious
crises in 1994 and 2001, both of which had financial roots
underpinned by serious mismatches between the structure of
liabilities and assets in terms of currency and maturity. Subse-
quently, Turkey embarked on serious structural and financial
reforms in 2001. The banking sector reform proved to be an
important catalyst of the broader reform agenda, resulting in a
structural break that deserves a special treatment in the time-
series analysis of the Turkish economic history.
The literature on the effects of capital mobility under finan-
cial account liberalization follows two theoretical tracks. The
first approach draws heavily on the predictions of the neoclas-
sical model where financial liberalization is expected to facili-
tate the efficient allocation of resources at an international level
(Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; Obstfeld, 1998;
Rogoff, 1999). The second view, presented by Rodrik (1998),
raises much doubt of the wisdom of liberalizing financial flows
as a strategic public choice. The concerns were further substan-
tiated in Eichengreen (2001, 2004) and Prasad, Rogoff, Wei,
and Kose (2003) who questioned the wisdom of liberalization
in the absence of defined measures to ensure the productive
usage of inflows and the right institutional setting—including
financial channels—to facilitate the efficient intermediation of
these inflows.
So, does liberalization of financial flows necessarily increase
the risk of crises or is it possible that it could be beneficial to
growth by allowing for higher levels of capital accumulation?
This question carries significant policy implications for many
developing countries that are in the process of contemplating
the speed and the degree of financial liberalization. To shed
additional light on the underlying issues, it is necessary to
understand how financial liberalization affects the dynamics of
domestic macroeconomic variables in countries that have
embarked on a higher degree of liberalization. Despite its
importance, this issue has not been thoroughly explored (for a
survey see Edwards, 2001; Eichengreen, 2001; Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Henry, 2003; Stiglitz, 2000).
In this paper, we shed light on the Turkish experience of
financial liberalization and its effect on domestic macroeco-
nomic variables, using quarterly data in a multivariate VAR
model. The proposed methodology analyzes the dynamics of
the interaction between financial flows and macroeconomic per-
formance, and provides the necessary evidence to study the
macroeconomic effects of financial liberalization. Among
MENA countries, the Turkish economy provides a unique
example in terms of domestic and external financial reforms
throughout the 1980s; yet it experienced a financial crisis in
2001. Hence, the analysis will draw lessons that could prove
informative for other countries in the region that have lagged
behind in the process of financial liberalization.
Accordingly, we examine the macroeconomic effects of
financial liberalization where we study many variables includ-
ing a set of macroeconomic variables in the VAR (real interest
rates, real effective exchange rates, real GDP, the inflation rate
and crises dummies) to better assess the simultaneous effects of
capital flows on economic performance during the period
1989–2009. We also take into consideration the crisis point in
2001 and estimate the effects of shocks, using quarterly data
during the sub-periods 1989:01–2001:01 and 2001:02–
2009:03. The sample period does not span the global financial
crisis to avoid the structural break that is likely to have magni-
fied capital outflows and subsequent implications, but is not
entirely attributed to domestic conditions and Turkish specific
policies as the recent experience of volatility of capital flows
attests.
Our findings indicate that capital flows have varying effects
on the Turkish economy before and after the crisis in 2001.
Indeed, the evidence supports significant effects of liberalizing
financial flows on macroeconomic performance, especially
during the post-crisis period. Specifically, this period is featured
by less inflationary pressures, which helped to stem the appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate and preserve export competi-
tiveness. In addition, the cost of credit was more contained,
which helped to sustain credit and investment growth and con-
tributed to real growth. Finally, there is significant evidence of
sterilization policy aiming to curb the effects of capital inflows
on the exchange rate and domestic liquidity in the post-crisis
period. These findings are very timely to the recent experience
of the Turkish economy that has slowed down on account of
heightened risks of capital outflows in anticipation of normal-
ization of monetary policy in the United States in 2015. Domes-
tic policies should aim at countering the spillover effects of
capital outflows on the domestic economy and reinforcing
prudent policies and structural reforms to strengthen the under-
lying fundamentals of the Turkish economy and resume well
managed capital inflows for robust liquidity and healthy credit
growth.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides the background of capital account liberalization in
Turkey. Section 3 is reserved for descriptive analysis. Section 4
1 See, e.g., Obstfeld (2009), Prasad (2011); Jeanne, Subramanian, and
Williamson (2012) and Turner (2014).
2 In support of the findings of the paper regarding the importance of capital
inflows to the growth of the Turkish economy, Morgan Stanley in 2013
identified Turkey as one of the “Fragile Five Emerging Economies”, citing
potential vulnerability to the widely anticipated tightening of US monetary
policy.
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outlines the econometric methodology for investigation.
Section 5 provides the empirical evidence, detailing the effects
of capital flows on main macroeconomic indicators. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Financial flows and capital account liberalization in
Turkey
Before the 1980’s, Turkey followed an inward oriented
import substitution strategy. However, the 1970’s were the years
of political conflicts and severe debt crisis. Following the new
government in 1980s, Turkey changed its strategy both eco-
nomically and politically towards a higher degree of openness
and liberalization. Quantitative restrictions on trade were lifted
and the country positioned itself towards a more export-
oriented growth strategy.
On the financial and monetary sides, the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey (Henceforth, CBRT) took important steps to
reform the local financial sector by removing interest rate ceil-
ings and freeing bank lending and borrowing. Reforms have
increasingly focused on using indirect monetary policy instru-
ments and introducing more flexibility into exchange rate man-
agement towards achieving a competitive real exchange rate
policy, supported by a repressed real wage regime throughout
the period 1981–1988. However, following significant losses on
capital and foreign debt and imbalances in public sector
finances, the exchange rate policy was replaced later by a
broader financial reform package inAugust 1989 to better align
the policy with the underlying economic fundamentals
(Berument and Dincer, 2004).
As the country embarked on a higher degree of financial
liberalization, the economy witnessed significant amounts of
capital inflows in the aftermath of liberalization. Furthermore,
the banking sector started to rely on short-term external
borrowing from international markets which rapidly increased
debt servicing and the situation turned into a Ponzi game
associated with external financial speculation (Ekinci, 1996).
As a result, sudden capital reversals started to be observed
and the economy witnessed a new financial crisis in April
1994 leading to significant decline of GDP by more than 6%
in the same year.
In 1995, the Turkish economy started to show signs of quick
recovery from the crisis, thanks to the new set of adjustments
brought into effect, allowing GDP to grow by 8%. The period
1996–1997 witnessed an increase that helped to overcome the
difficulties of the current account. In addition, the registered
improvement in international reserves and the loosening of the
monetary policy contributed to a large extent to the enhance-
ment of economic activity. The public debt started to increase as
well as the burden of servicing external debt after the nominal
depreciation announced by the CBRT that came as a response to
higher inflation expectations.
As of December 1999, Turkey adopted a new disinflation
program with the technical support of the IMF and another
exchange rate regime that goes with the new hallmarks of the
economy. The new regime is the crawling peg where the Turkish
lira was linked to a basket of foreign currencies composed of
the US Dollar and the Deutsche Mark. The new program gave
encouraging signals as the economy registered a growth rate of
4.8% in early 2000 and the interest rate on the Treasury bond
auction dropped from 96.4% in late 1999 to 34.1% in early
2000.
However, with the appreciation of the real exchange rate,
the foreign currency debt of the banking sector increased to
critical levels that were even threatening the soundness of the
system. Furthermore, the current account rose significantly
after the increase in the cost of imports. These imbalances
were the origins of a sudden surge in capital outflows in late
2000 that contributed significantly to the banking crisis and
the deterioration of international reserves of the CBRT. As a
consequence, the crawling exchange rate regime was
abandoned in early 2001 which resulted in a depreciation of
the exchange rate with more than 90% and a contraction of
the economic activity by 9.4%.
In May 2001, a new ambitious set of structural reforms was
implemented that adopts a more rigorous macroeconomic dis-
cipline, a rehabilitation of the banking sector and more trans-
parent management of public accounts. In this context, a more
tight fiscal policy was adopted to have a better control of the
public debt. In parallel, a large privatization program was ini-
tiated to support either the cleanup of the banking sector or the
stabilization of the public debt.
The pack of reforms also witnessed the adoption of floating
exchange rate regime that was heavily supported by the IMF
and World Bank credits to increase the scope for effective
monetary policy. The CBRT was called to strengthen its control
over short-term interest rates in parallel with this floating
regime.
The reforms showed immediate signs of improvement of
the economy starting from late 2001: significant reduction of
the public debt, decline of inflation rates along with higher
output growth rates. The period 2002–2006 saw the Turkish
economy reaping the macroeconomic benefits of these reforms
with high growth rates decreasing inflation and public debt.
These performances increased the confidence in the economy
and lowered the risk premia accordingly. Nevertheless, despite
such performances, the current account deficit remained very
high due mainly to the significant presence of imports in
production.
Starting from 2007, the Turkish economy was largely
affected, first by the consequences of the financial turbulence of
2006 and, second, by the large political uncertainty and election
process. It resulted in a lower growth that continued during
subsequent years 2008 and 2009 due to increasing uncertainty
around the world with the adverse effects of the global financial
crisis and distortions in the major global markets of vital com-
modities i.e. oil, wheat, and gold.
However, following these crises the economy has emerged in
a stronger position that strengthened its presence in the world as
promising emerging economy with a high potential of growth.
The economy seems to have well capitalized on its previous
performance and especially the deep and structural reforms that
have paid off to sustain growth and reap the benefits of capital
inflows.
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3. Descriptive statistics
To signify the importance of the 2001 crisis and subsequent
reforms as a major structural change in the Turkish economy
and investigate its relationship with key macroeconomic indi-
cators, Table 1 reports the statistics relative to the mean,
maximum, minimum and standard deviation of some key indi-
cators during the pre- and post- 2001periods. The set of indi-
cators include net international reserves as a proxy of capital
account liberalization, real GDP growth, inflation based on the
consumer price index, fiscal deficit, change in the real effective
exchange rate, money growth (M1) and the interest rate mea-
sured by the overnight interbank rate.
It stands out from Table 1 that the Turkish economy is
characterized by less volatility in real growth during the post
2001 period despite the lower average real growth. We note,
likewise, high and persistent inflation during the pre-2001
period whereas in the second sub-period, the inflation rate
decreased to single-digit numbers. The significantly lower
inflation may be attributed to tight monetary policy and
structural reforms. Indeed, monetary growth was significantly
higher in the pre-crisis period, and higher inflation reflected
itself in the much higher interbank rate, compared to the post-
crisis period.
Efforts to improve public finances in the post-crisis period
have resulted in larger surpluses, which coupled with higher
growth, helped to put the public debt ratio on a downward
trajectory. Indeed, the public debt ratio decreased significantly
after 2001 and the debt ratio remained at sustainable levels
estimated at 51% of GDP in 2009, despite higher fiscal deficits
(−6% of GDP in 2009) even during the height of the global
crisis in 2009.
The external position was further boosted by economic lib-
eralization that led to mobilizing exports, as the share of exports
to GDP increased from 18.66% to 23.63%, on average between
the two sub-periods, resulting in improvement in the current
account balance in the post crisis period. Further, economic
reforms have paid off to mobilize investors’ confidence and
reduce uncertainty which increased the scope to attract finan-
cial inflows and high amount of international reserves, relative
to imports.
External stability was further boosted by greater flexibility
of the exchange rate in the post-crisis period which resulted in
an increase of the local currency in nominal terms from 0.8 to
1.5 per US$. Despite significant reduction in the inflation rate,
nominal appreciation of the Turkish lira has resulted in, on
average, higher real appreciation of the currency, reflecting
stronger external position in the post-crisis period.
4. Econometric methodology
To study the macroeconomic effects of capital account lib-
eralization, we approximate an economy represented by a VAR
model composed of a capital inflow variable and a vector of key
macroeconomic variables, as follows3:
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where xt and wt represent the capital inflows variable and a
vector of macroeconomic variables respectively. εxt and εwt are
orthogonalized disturbances.
Equation (1) can also be written in the following matrix
form:
AY B B Yt t t= + +−0 1 1 ε (2)
Since there is under-identification of the VAR in Equation
(1), we may use a recursive system to identify the model by
forming A as a lower triangular (Sims, 1980). This implies that
xt has a contemporaneous effect on wt but the reverse is not true.
Accordingly, Equation (2) is rewritten in a way that allows the
identification of the structural shocks from the residuals of the
recursive VAR model, as follows:
Y C C Y et t t= + +−0 1 1 (3)
where C0 = A−1B0, C1 = A−1B1 and + et = A−1εt. Thus, the structural
shocks are identified from the residuals εxt (the residual of xt in
Equation (3)) and εwt (the residual vector of wt in Equation (3)).
Both residuals εxt and εwt affect the vector of key economic
3 The advantage is modeling variables based on an economic structure that
accounts for the transmission mechanism of the shocks to the various variables.
The estimation of this model renders economic interpretation more meaningful,
rather than relying on ad hoc estimation of a Vector error correction model that
treats all variables as endogenous with respect to all shocks originating in the
economic system, regardless of the order of the transmission mechanism
imposed by economic theory.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Before the crisis: 1989:01–2001:01 After the crisis: 2001:02–2009:03
Average Max. Min. STDEV Average Max. Min. STDEV
International reserves (Million TRY) 20582.97 35924.7 6278.8 9214.29 69173.2 117611.7 29698.3 32457.37
Real GDP growth (%) 2.59 47.64 −21.68 20.82 4.84 21.66 −13.84 11.98
Inflation (CPI, %) 14.67 40.54 5.76 5.59 4.20 20.53 −0.37 4.46
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) −5.14 0.90 −12.72 3.39 −5.54 2.63 −18.19 5.47
Change in REER (%) 0.82 12.59 −23.10 6.68 1.51 19.00 −17.86 8.70
Monetary growth (M1, %) 15.21 46.61 −20.02 13.73 8.27 69.91 −9.66 13.07
Interbank interest rate 73.25 211.46 31.00 34.28 26.64 71.82 8.05 17.34
Source: Authors’ calculations based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012), World Bank (2012) and CBRT (2012).
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variables of interest wt contemporaneously. However, εxt
affects contemporaneously only xt. The identification of the
orthogonalized residuals of the VAR according to a triangular
form is known as the Cholesky decomposition.
Thus, an asymmetry is brought to the system through this
latter restriction which makes the order of the variables impor-
tant. The Turkish economy is assumed to be affected by capital
inflows, but not vice versa, being small open economy with still
many structural issues and political instability and foreign
direct investment is not sizable enough compared to its eco-
nomic performance.
4.1. Variables and data
The effect of capital account liberalization in Turkey is ana-
lyzed using a VAR model and we infer the effects of capital
account liberalization and the resulting capital flow shocks on
macroeconomic variables, while taking into account the effect
of the crisis at the beginning of 2001. The variables included in
the VAR are capital account liberalization (KAL), real interest
rate (INTER), real effective exchange rate (REER), the money
stock (M), real output (y) and the price index (CPI). The real
private consumption and real investment are also included in
the VAR afterward to test how demand variables respond to
capital shocks.
The ordering of the variables in the VAR is important and
the capital account proxy comes first, since the objective is to
address its impact on macroeconomic variables. The real
interest rate is put second since it is expected that capital
flows would increase domestic liquidity, decreasing the
nominal interest rate and the effect on the real interest rate
would be dependent on accompanying inflationary effects.
Similarly, under the prevailing flexible exchange rate regime
in Turkey, capital inflow appreciates the nominal exchange
rate of the Turkish Lira, which could be further reinforced via
the build-up of inflationary pressures, and therefore the real
exchange rate is placed third. The money stock and income
per capita are put forth and fifth, respectively, as an increase
in international reserves contributes to higher growth of the
money supply which could be mobilized to increase real
growth. Finally, the price level comes last in the ranking
because of the direct effect of money growth on inflation.
However, capacity constraints could hinder the growth
momentum and fuel price inflation in the face of higher
capital inflows. The allocation of higher liquidity between real
growth and price inflation will be dependent on supply-side
constraints and the elasticity to increase the output supply in
the face of higher domestic demand.
Regarding the measures of the variables, the capital
account liberalization (KAL) is proxied by net international
reserves of the Central Bank.4 INTER refers to the real interest
rate equal to the difference between the nominal interest rate
and the inflation rate, where the nominal rate is the overnight
interbank rate and the inflation rate is calculated as the
percentage change of the consumer price index. REER is the
real effective exchange rate and is computed, according to
the Central Bank of Turkey as the weighted geometric average
of the prices in Turkey relative to the prices of its principal
trade partners. M is the money stock in circulation (M1), y is
the GDP5 in 1998 prices, RCP is consumption in 1998 prices,
RINV is investment in 1998 prices and P is the price level
measured by the consumer price index as a measure of the
price level. All data are obtained from the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey (2010).
The variables are expressed in logarithm with the exception
of the real interest rate. We also add constant quarterly seasonal
dummies and dummy variable for the 1994 crisis and the late
2000 crisis. The different integration tests (Augmented Dickey-
Fuller, Phillips-Perron and KPSS Tests) show that the variables
are integrated of order one (I (1)) and their first differences are
stationary (I (0)). Finally, the optimal lag of the VAR is deter-
mined using the Akaike information criteria. They are available
upon request.
5. Empirical investigation
5.1. The impact of capital flows on macroeconomic variables
Figs. 1 and 2 display the impulse responses with 95% prob-
ability bands, using the bootstrap method with 500 draws, for
the different variables included in the VAR after one standard
deviation in capital flows over 16 quarters or four years.6 The
middle lines in the different figures refer to the median of the
draws.7
It stands out from the figures that the effects are different if
we consider the two sub-periods. Indeed, the effect of the
capital inflow shock on the interest rate is negative during the
first two quarters of the first sub-period 1989:01–2001:01, and
it becomes insignificant during the second sub-period8
2001:02–2009:03.
Regarding the real effective exchange rate, a capital flow
shock led to an appreciation of the local currency during
three quarters of the first sub-period 1989:01–2001:01.
Nevertheless, the appreciation seems to be short lasting, as it
converges to its pre-shock level. In contrast, the insignificance
of the effects during the post-crisis period may reflect less
4 The widespread empirical literature reports many measures for capital
account liberalization and most of them are indices or proportions (Chinn and
Ito, 2006; Quinn, 1997; Rodrik, 1998). We use the net international reserves as
a quantitative proxy. TheVAR framework is based on the contributions of Kraay
(1998) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
5 GDP data is based on new National Account data announced by Turkish
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) (2007). As the data start from 1998, the
period covering 1987–1998 is calculated by the Authors using the growth rates
of the old National Account data.
6 We check the effect of capital flows on macroeconomic variables before and
after the 2001 crisis. However, for the 1994 crisis it does not seem to affect the
results as we took into consideration a dummy in the VAR, the output does not
show any significant change.
7 We used Eviews 8 Software to carry out the different estimations and
graphs.
8 We also carried out estimations that exclude the second quarter of 2001
(i.e., 2001:02) as it corresponds to the crisis period but the results do not display
significant differences with those reported in Figs. (1) and (2).
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inflationary pressures and, therefore, better ability to control
real appreciation, compared to the earlier period.
During the second sub-period 2001:02–2009:03, impulse
responses indicate a negative response of the money stock to
capital inflows followed by a long-lasting positive effect. The
difference reflects a deliberate attempt by monetary authorities
to sterilize capital inflows in the post-crisis period in an effort to
contain further surge in inflationary pressures which dominated
the macroeconomic structure and demanded first priority in the
design of macroeconomic policies.
To reinforce the previous points, we note that the effect of
the shocks on consumer price inflation is also different between
the pre- and post-crisis periods. Accordingly, sterilization
efforts in the post-crisis period aimed at mitigating the infla-
tionary effects of higher capital inflows. This is in contrast to
price inflation in the pre-crisis period where the responses to
capital inflows are almost insignificant.
Finally, regarding the impulse response function of real GDP
to capital flows, the different figures show a general decrease in
real output within the first quarter following the shock for each
sub-period. In other words, the dynamic effect of one standard
deviation shock in capital flows does not generate significant
changes in real output starting from the second quarter.
However, in light of significant sterilization, the positive effects
of capital flows on real GDP appear shorter-lived and the reac-
tion magnitude is smaller in the post-crisis period, compared to
the pre-crisis period.
5.2. Variance decomposition
The variance decomposition analysis is carried out to see the
importance of shocks to capital flows in explaining changes of
key macroeconomic variables of the VAR model. Specifically,
the variance measures the cumulative fluctuations over different
horizons in the forecast error of changes in the capital flows
proxy.We perform the forecast error variance decomposition of
capital flows during pre- and post-crisis periods with 2, 4 and 8
quarters and the results are displayed in Table 2.
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Fig. 1. Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to one standard deviation of capital inflows before the crisis: 1989:01–2001:01.
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The first panel of results, relative to the pre-crisis period,
indicates that capital account movements are accounted for
mainly by their own shocks, which dissipate gradually over
time (95%–60%). Likewise, shocks to the capital account con-
tribute also to the change of the money stock, the consumer
price index within a year and the interbank interest rate, after 8
quarters, with 17% of total variability. However, the effect of
capital account movements on real GDP appears significantly
smaller.
The results, reported in the second panel of the post-crisis
period, are quite different from the first set, as the autonomous
capital account shocks are explaining variations in capital flows
with at least 76%. Moreover, with the exception of the money
stock, the effects of the shocks have smaller effects on the
remainder of key macroeconomic variables, compared to the
earlier period. The evidence indicates persistent capital inflows
to the Turkish economy, attesting to higher investors’ confi-
dence in the economy in the post-crisis period. Moreover,
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to one standard deviation of capital inflows after the crisis, 2001:02–2009:03.
Table 2
Forecast error variance decomposition of the capital account proxy,
1989:01–2001:01.
Horizon/period LKA INTER LREER LM LP LY
Pre-crisis period: 1989:01–2001:01
2 quarters 95.42
(5.47)
0.08
(1.63)
0.40
(1.04)
2.22
(2.53)
1.17
(2.25)
0.67
(2.64)
4 quarters 84.92
(10.54)
2.78
(4.87)
2.56
(3.84)
5.14
(4.14)
3.99
(3.67)
0.57
(3.09)
8 quarters 60.05
(19.06)
17.17
(13.05)
6.39
(6.85)
8.49
(5.29)
7.49
(4.45)
0.38
(3.15)
Post-crisis period: 2001:02–2009:03
2 quarters 94.98
(6.56)
0.06
(1.43)
0.31
(2.42)
3.73
(5.20)
1.03
(1.99)
0.009
(1.57)
4 quarters 83.9
(13.64)
0.66
(2.91)
0.26
(5.02)
12.85
(12.16)
1.76
(3.47)
0.53
(3.62)
8 quarters 75.87
(17.09)
2.94
(5.60)
2.55
(8.25)
14.59
(15.59)
3.32
(5.24)
0.70
(4.83)
Numbers between brackets are standard errors.
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available liquidity through this pool has contributed to the
growth of the money supply towards mobilizing investment and
real growth. Successful sterilization policies have mitigated the
nominal effects of capital flows, compared to the earlier period.
5.3. Boom-bust cycles
In this section we investigate if the Turkish economy
experienced a boom–bust cycle after the capital account
liberalization. Generally, in economies with tight control of
the financial account and less developed financial sector,
liberalization of capital flows is likely to have large marginal
returns. Accordingly, the periods following the liberalization
of the capital account usually witness an expansion of
economic activity with substantial increase in credit for
investment and consumption, an appreciation of the real
exchange rate and asset price bubbles. However, such effect is
not likely to last indefinitely and the boom phase may tend to
reverse itself as the economy reaches its potential and the
bubble is bound to burst.
Indeed, continued appreciation of the real exchange rate in
the face of persistent capital inflows may generate loss in the
international competitiveness of exports, while increasing
demand for imports and widening the current account deficits.
The loss of competitiveness helps to slowdown the
momentum of capital inflows as it reverses expectations about
a booming economy that has large capacity to continue attract
foreign capital flows. This, coupled with prudent policies
including fiscal consolidation and tight monetary growth,
usually help to reverse the cycle. If the reversal is managed
gradually the adverse effects on the economy could be
contained in the form of a gradual return to potential.
However, if the reversal cycle is significantly delayed and
abrupt, adjustments in the exchange rate following a bubble
burst could mark the beginning of a bust cycle that exhibits
higher capital outflows and a severe slowdown in economic
activity. Indeed, the recent experience of a surge of capital
outflow has been identified as a key risk factor for subsequent
busts of the financial cycle. To stem the risk, macro prudential
measures should be invoked in a timely manner in response to
continued monitoring of the implications of capital flows to
the domestic economy to ensure the stability of the financial
system and hedge against the potential risks of capital
outflows that could slow down the macro economy and risk
stability of the financial system.9
To test if a boom–bust cycle happened after the liberalization
of the capital account in Turkey, we perform impulse responses
to see how demand variables respond to capital shocks. We use
the same VAR structure as in Equation (1), although the wt
vector includes real demand variables which are real private
consumption (RCP), real investment (RINV) and consumer
price index (CPI). This latter variable is put last because of the
possible effect of a higher domestic demand on price inflation.
As far as theTurkish economy is concerned, a close inspection
of the impulse response functions of consumption, investment and
the price index in Fig. 3 clearly demonstrates that the real activity
seems to be closely linked to the evolution of aggregate demand
during the two sub-periods. In contrast, during the post-crisis
sub-period 2001:02–2009:03, the responses of aggregate demand
to capital flows are larger and long-lasting, preserving the positive
effects on growth and inflation (Fig. 4). It is worth noting the
divergent nature of the impulse responses in Fig. 4, attesting to
significant structural break that boosted aggregate demand in the
post-crisis period on a sustainable basis, beyond the effect of
capital flows. Such findings are similar to those ofMontiel (1996)
and Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), Calvo (1996) for the
case of Latin American countries who found evidence of real
exchange rate appreciation and consumption booms following
capital inflows. However, it is worth noting a significantly smaller
effect on consumption, compared to that on investment. The
difference attests to the success of policies in Turkey to capitalize
on capital inflows towards increasing investment and exports,
hence mobilizing real growth and mitigating the corresponding
inflationary effects.
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
In this paper, we have tested the effects of capital account
liberalization on macroeconomic variables using a VAR frame-
work with quarterly data covering the period 1989:01–2009:03,
ending before the turbulent episode surrounding the global
financial crisis. We distinguish two sub-periods where the first
one corresponds to the nineties period and the second period
embraces the years post the 2001 financial crisis.
The general picture that emerges from the analysis of the two
sub-periods, and in particular the post-crisis period (after
2001), is increasing effort to control money growth and price
inflation in the face of higher capital inflows to avoid the
adverse effects on competitiveness, export growth, credit
growth, and real growth.
Moreover, the drive to ease capacity constraints and control
government spending in the post-crisis period has helped to
contain inflationary pressures. Indeed, the factual evidence
attests to the fact that the appreciation in the real exchange rate
was less pronounced in the post-crisis period, which helped to
contain the adverse effects on export competitiveness and the
current account deficit. In parallel, efforts to contain inflation
have paid off to contain the increase in the cost of credit, which
helped to mobilize credit growth and sustain the growth
momentum.
The sharp contrast in the effects of capital flows on macro-
economic performance before and after the financial crisis in
Turkey provides a testament of the need to enforce complemen-
tary domestic policies to maximize the return on capital flows.
Efficient mobilization of financial flows requires a healthy
financial system that is capable of availing resources for private
activity, fiscal consolidation to contain inflationary pressures,
and vigilant monetary policy to stem the risk of real exchange
appreciation and effectively manage domestic liquidity. Absent
these complementary policies, financial flows could be a curse9 See, e.g., Banks for International Settlements (2013, 2014).
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on the economy as they could motivate a lax fiscal policy, fuel
price inflation and appreciate the real exchange rate, resulting in
loss of competitiveness that hinders private activity and real
growth.
Problems are further compounded in the event of a crisis that
erodes confidence and motivates capital outflows, as the recent
experience of the Turkish economy demonstrates resulting in
severe imbalances that build up external debt and increase the
risk of sharp currency depreciation. As the recent events sur-
rounding the global crisis have demonstrated, enforcing tempo-
rary capital controls may prove to be more prudent to mitigate
the adverse effects of capital flows in the short term and the risk
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LRCP to LKAL
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LRINV to LKAL
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LP to LKAL
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Response of LY to LKAL
Fig. 3. Impulse responses of aggregate demand variables to one standard deviation of capital inflows before the crisis: 1989:01–2001:01.
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Fig. 4. Impulse responses of aggregate demand variables to one standard deviation of capital inflows after the crisis: 2001:02–2009:03.
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of sudden stop that could escalate to a crisis of a large magni-
tude. In parallel, the central bank should strengthen its capacity
to ensure financial stability in the banking system and invoke
the right macro prudential measures in support of adequate
liquidity and robust credit growth that stem the risks of sudden
capital outflows. However, the success of these short-term mea-
sures hinges on complementary adjustment policies and struc-
tural reforms to reinforce economic fundamentals in order to
sustain growth and mitigate short-term vulnerability that could
jeopardize the growth agenda in the long-term.
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